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Abstract
In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which
different levels of competition take place simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new
class of tournament models, called multilayered tournaments, to capture this type of
competitive environment. Among other things, we find that: (i) an increase in individual
incentives, holding the level of team incentives fixed, can lower total effort as it induces
inefficient allocation of effort; (ii) the optimal level of individual incentives depends on and
is complementary to the level of team incentives. The analysis illuminates the essential
role of economic subgroups, such as firms, in achieving some degree of cooperation in an
inherently competitive environment, and provides an explanation for why high-powered
incentives are more common in market arrangements than within firms.
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1 Introduction
In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which within-
group internal competition and across-group external competition take place simultaneously.
A leading example of this situation is the competition among workers, where they compete
against each other within their respective firms for promotions while those firms in turn
compete against each other for market shares. Similarly, politicians compete against each
other for candidacy within their political parties which in turn compete against each other
in elections. Professional athletes compete with teammates within their teams which in
turn compete with each other in their respective leagues. Academic researchers compete
against each other for publication slots or research funds within their disciplines which in
turn compete against each other for students or public recognition. Multilayered competition
is fairly common and ubiquitous in society: after all, human beings have engaged in various
types of competition within their respective communities, such as tribes, villages, states and
countries, for the pursuit of internal resources, while those communities have simultaneously
competed against each other for the pursuit of external resources.
Many of the instances raised above have a common simple structure which we characterize
by the following three features. First, the nature of competition is relative, at least to some
extent, where more productive ones tend to capture more of the available resources.1 Second,
even though intense internal competition undoubtedly underlies the strength of a team, team
production occupies an essential part of the production process in each of these cases, so that
it is essential to foster cooperation among teammates and let them help each other when
necessary. Finally and most importantly, agents compete simultaneously at two distinct
levels that are not clearly distinguishable in the sense that they cannot direct their resources
(such as time and effort) exclusively to a particular level of competition.2 This last feature
is the defining feature of multilayered competition which sets the current analysis apart
1The nature of competition naturally becomes relative because the total amount of rewards is typically
bounded from above, in which case one’s gain necessarily becomes someone else’s loss at some point. It is well
recognized that many forms of internal competition, such as promotion tournaments, have a relative aspect
because total prize, either pecuniary or nonpecuniary, is generally bounded from above. Likewise, many forms
of external competition have this feature as well: for instance, the market share of a firm often depends on the
firm’s relative product quality level rather than the absolute level. A similar argument also applies to political
competition in which the number of winners is exogenously fixed, both internally and externally.
2For some of the examples raised above, the two levels of competition literally takes place simultaneously,
as in the case of the competition among workers, so that it is not feasible to make a clear distinction between
them: that is, it is in principle not feasible to allocate resources to one level of competition without affecting
the relative standing at the other level. In contrast, in political campaigns, the competition itself can be
sequential where the internal competition (primary) precedes the external competition. Even in this case,
however, if what politicians need to do is to make investment in necessary skills and/or to frame basic policies,
it is hard to distinguish the two levels of competition.
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from dynamic elimination tournaments (Rosen, 1990) where each round of competition is
independent from others with no strategic interactions.
In this paper, we propose a new class of tournament models which intend to capture these
aforementioned features of multilayered competition. We consider an environment in which
homogenous agents are divided into symmetric teams and compete with each other both
within and across teams simultaneously. To capture the possibility of within-group coopera-
tion, the option of helping others a la Itoh (1991) is incorporated into this framework, so that
each agent must allocate his resources between improving his own productivity (own effort)
and helping teammates (helping effort). Although the analysis of multilayered competition
can easily get intractable due to its complicated hierarchical interactions between different
layers of competition, we devise a framework that is tractable enough to conduct various
comparative statics exercises. Viewing it as a model of markets and internal organizations,
the present framework then illuminates the elusive link between these two primary allocation
mechanisms and provides answers to a set of questions concerning the relationship between
them, such as how incentive provision within firms should depend on the extent of market
competition, under what circumstances pro-competitive market policies are more desirable,
why high-powered incentives are more commonly found in markets than stronger than within
firms, and above all, why firm organizations are so ubiquitous in the first place.
We obtain several results and implications. First, the analysis sheds some light on the
essential role of economic subgroups, such as firms, in achieving the right balance between
competition and cooperation. It is in general impossible to induce cooperation which involves
all agents when they cannot be rewarded jointly. Even in this situation, however, it is still
possible to achieve some degree of cooperation by dividing agents into smaller subgroups and
having them pit against one another. Our analysis shows that the possibility of coopera-
tion is what makes multilayered competition both necessary and meaningful. A multilayered
tournament virtually has no bite when there is no possibility of helping others, as any fea-
sible allocation can be achieved by a conventional single-layered tournament in this case.
Conversely, when the underlying production process calls for some degree of cooperation, a
multilayered tournament provides a fairly effective way to induce helping effort even in an
inherently competitive environment where there are necessarily winners and losers.
Second, we show that an increase in individual incentives, holding the extent of team
incentives fixed, could induce inefficient substitution between the two types of effort and
consequently result in lower total effort. This result points to yet another route though
which the adverse effect of individual incentives arises. While there is little doubt that
intense internal competition better motivates agents at the individual level, it also necessarily
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impedes cooperation among them. We identify conditions under which an increase in own
effort induced by more intense internal competition is more than offset by a decrease in
helping effort, thereby leading to a reduction in total effort. We also relate this finding to
two widely cited results in the literature – sabotage in a tournament (Lazear, 1989) and the
multi-task problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) – and suggest an underlying connection
between them.
Third, the analysis illuminates the general superiority of team incentives, despite the fact
that their effectiveness is generally limited by the notorious freerider problem. We show that
although the optimal level of individual incentives may be zero under some conditions, the
optimal level of team incentives is always bounded away from zero. The key observation
here is that individual incentives can induce own effort only at the expense of a decrease in
helping effort. In contrast, team incentives generally yield positive effects in both directions
as they are more inclusive and work at a higher level. We argue that this observation accords
well with Williamson’s view (1985) that high-powered incentives are more common in market
arrangements than within firms.
Forth, we provide a new perspective on how individual and team incentives should be
related to each other. We show that the optimal incentive scheme at one level of competition
cannot be determined independently of the extent of incentives provided for the other level.
We in particular show that the relationship between individual and team incentives is com-
plementary, where a decrease in one should be accompanied by a decrease in the other. As
practical implications, the result suggests that: stronger individual incentives tend to work
well in environments with more intense market competition; pro-competitive policies are more
likely to be justified in environments where stronger individual incentives are provided within
firms.
Finally, we also conduct various comparative statics exercises on team size. A larger
team obviously exacerbates the freerider problem, but could raise the incentive to help others
because it may be easier or less costly to help other teammates when more of them are
around. This is especially the case when helping effort takes the form of sharing information
with teammates (or contributing to a public good). In the presence of such a scale effect, if
the social planner can dictate the effort levels of each agent, it is always desirable to have as
large a team as possible so as to fully exploit the scale effect, i.e., a grand coalition is always
socially optimal. This is not incentive compatible, however, as there is clearly no incentive
to help others when all of the agents are grouped into one team. The optimal team size must
balance these concerns, and we derive conditions under which a larger team size is warranted.
Related literature: The paper largely falls into a class of tournament models and extends
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this setting by incorporating team competition. While most tournament models, starting
from Lazear and Rosen (1981), focus on competition among individuals, there is a handful of
works which examine competition among teams (Drago, et al., 1996; Marino and Zabojnik,
2004; Ishida 2006; Gurtler, 2008).3 The major difference from these works is that they only
consider competition among teams with no regard to competition among individuals, where
the sharing rule within a team is exogenously given.4 The scope of the current analysis is
totally different since our primary focus is on the interaction between the two distinct levels
of competition connected through two-dimensional effort choices.
One essential aspect of the model is the presence of team production in which each agent’s
contribution to total output cannot be measured accurately (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Holmstrom, 1981). This naturally gives rise to the freerider problem, which substantially
diminishes the effectiveness of team incentives. Although the freerider problem necessarily
entails efficiency loss, team production also has a bright side as it can encourage teammates
to cooperate with each other for the betterment of the team. Our setup with helping effort
is heavily indebted to Itoh (1991) who introduces the option of helping others to a standard
moral hazard problem.5 This paper follows this approach to capture a situation in which
mutual cooperation is at the core of the production process, although its extent is confined
within the boundary of a team. We then take a step further by integrating internal and exter-
nal competition in order to illuminate the connection between them and derive implications
from it.
There are now numerous works which analyze incentive provision within firms in the filed
of organizational economics; there are also many works on various market regulations and
competition policies in the field of industrial organization. With few exceptions, however,
these two strands of literature have developed rather independently from each other, partly
due to the technical difficulty of placing organizational and market interactions into a unified
3For experimental studies on team tournaments, see Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) and Sutter and Strass-
mair (2009).
4Technically, since our model builds on Tullock (1980), there is also some connection with works on rent-
seeking contests. The current analysis is especially related to works on “collective contests” (Nitzan, 1991;
Warneryd, 1998; Inderst et al., 2007; Munster, 2007; Nitzan and Ueda, 2011) although they differ in scope
and motivation to a great extent: the main focus of this strand of literature is on the equilibrium rate of
rent dissipation, i.e., the ratio of total contest expenditures to the total prize size. Along this line, Munster
(2007) considers a situation where agents must make multi-dimensional effort choices as in ours. Aside from
the differences in scope and motivation, the major difference is that in Munster, individual and collective
appropriative activities are totaly separated from each other, so that each agent can specifically direct his
resources to a particular level of competition.
5Che and Yoo (2001) consider a relational contracting environment and show that there exists a cooperative
subgame perfect equilibrium which induces effort at a lower cost. In these works, absolute performance
evaluation is feasible for contracting. Ishida (2006) extends this idea and shows that this same mechanism
also works even when only relative performance measures are feasible for contracting.
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framework. Still, some attempts have been made to integrate these two strands. One ap-
proach in this direction examines the effect of market competition on managerial behaviors
and incentives (Hart, 1983; Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; and Raith, 2003). Yet another
approach looks at the effect of incentive provision on market outcomes through oligopolis-
tic interactions (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Also, see Morita (2012) for a recent attempt
to integrate human resource management and market competition. The paper intends to
contribute to this line of inquiry from a different perspective with particular focus on the
multilayered nature of competition and to provide a framework which captures the elusive
link between markets and internal organizations in an intuitive and tractable manner.
2 Model
Environment: We consider a set I of N ≥ 4 homogeneous agents who are divided into m
symmetric teams competing for prizes. We assume that N is some even (and relatively large)
integer. Throughout the analysis, the number of agents within each team is denoted by n ≥ 2
where N = mn. Note that the case with n = 1 represents the situation where each agent
forms his own team, so that the nature of competition is effectively single-layered with no
within-group competition.6 For comparative statics exercises, we mainly focus on the range
N := [2, N2 ].
The structure of competition is multilayered in the sense that agents compete with each
other both at the individual level (the internal competition) and the aggregate level (the
external competition) simultaneously. Throughout the analysis, we index agents by i =
1, 2, ..., n and teams by j = 1, 2, ...,m, and use the following notations:
• Ij : the set of agents in team j;
• I−ij : the set of agents in team j other than agent i (or agent i’s “teammates”);
• T : the set of all teams;
• T−j : the set of teams other than team j.
Note that each agent is in principle identified by a pair (i, j); in what follows, however, we
abbreviate the team index and refer to each agent as agent i for brevity.
6Note also that the case with n = N where there exists only one team (a grand coalition) which involves
all the agents is strategically equivalent to the case with n = 1 if the reward structure is set optimally. As
we will see, however, the case with n = N is generally dominated by the case with n = 1 when the reward
structure is given arbitrarily.
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The current setting admits a number of possible interpretations, as mentioned in the intro-
duction. Among those possibilities, we primarily view this as a model of markets and internal
organizations although no market competition which we observe in reality may correspond
physically to the external competition as specified here. Nonetheless, we here emphasize the
fact that the current specification captures a situation where a team (or a firm) gains more
when it does better than other competitors in a broad sense, which should be true in almost
any form of market competition. The external competition in the current setting should thus
be regarded as a “reduced-form” of market competition which can actually assume many
different forms at a more superficial level.
Effort choice: Each agent independently and simultaneously chooses his effort pair eij =
(aij , bij) ∈ R
2
+, where aij is the level of own effort and bij is the effort level of helping effort.
The effort cost is given by
cij = C(aij , bij).
A key departure from the previous literature is the addition of helping effort into a tourna-
ment framework. The necessity of helping each other arises largely from the fact that agents
are often heterogeneous in skills or sets of information they have: in that case, they can
improve the productive efficiency, e.g., by reallocating tasks to reap the benefit of skill com-
plementarities and/or sharing critical knowledge that may be dispersedly distributed within
the team. Throughout the analysis, we simply assume that helping effort is allocated evenly
among the teammates and benefits each teammate equally (or alternatively focus on a class
of cost functions under which it is optimal to allocate helping effort evenly among the team-
mates).7 Define hij :=
∑
i′∈I−ij
bi′j
n−1 as the amount of helping effort agent i receives from his
teammates. Agent i’s total effort, denoted as xij , is then given by
xij = F (aij , hij),
We assume that these functions satisfy the usual properties.
Assumption 1 (i) The cost function C is strictly increasing and weakly convex in each
respective argument. (ii) The production function F is strictly increasing and weakly concave
in each respective argument.
For the analysis, it is often convenient to define
G(a, b) :=
F1(a, b)
C1(a, b)
, H(a, b) :=
F2(a, b)
C2(a, b)
.
7It is in principle possible to extend helping effort to agents in other teams. We rule out this possibility at
the outset, however, as there is no incentive to do so under any monotonic incentive scheme.
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Note that under the maintained assumption, G and H are strictly increasing in a and b,
respectively. Moreover, we impose the following assumptions .
Assumption 2 lima→0G =∞ and limb→0H =∞.
Assumption 3 G2 > 0 and H1 > 0.
Assumption 2 assures the existence of interior solutions. Assumption 3 indicates that the
two types of effort are complementary to each other. We make this assumption to focus our
attention to the case where it is optimal to allocate resources between the two activities, rather
than to devote all resources to one activity. One can easily see that a sufficient condition for
them is that F12 ≥ 0 and C12 ≤ 0 with at least one holding with strict inequality.
Contest success function: Define rij as the probability that agent i wins the internal
competition, and qj as the probability that team j wins the external competition. We adopt
the (generalized) Tullock success function to determine the winner at each respective level of
competition. Letting zj :=
∑
i∈Ij
xij denote the total effort for team j, the contest success
functions are specified as
rij =
xαij∑
i′∈Ij
xαi′j
, qj =
zαj∑
j′∈T z
α
j′
.
The Tullock specification is known to have some strategic foundations (Fullerton and McAfee,
1999; Baye and Hoppe, 2003) as well as axiomatic justifications (Skaperdas, 1996; Clark and
Riis, 1998). Important features of this specification are that: (i) taking all the others’ effort
choices as given, the winning probability is increasing in one’s effort level; (ii) taking one’s
effort choices as given, the winning probability is decreasing in the effort level of each of the
other agents. We adopt this specification mostly for its greater tractability, among a plethora
of possibilities which can capture these features.
Prize allocation: We assume that the individual winner is identifiable only in the winning
team so that there are three possible contest outcomes: the winner in the winning team, the
losers in the winning team, and all the others in the losing teams.8 Given this information
structure, it suffices to consider a three-level reward schedule, denoted by (W,w, l), where
W is the reward for the winner in the winning team, w for the losers in the winning team,
and l for all the agents in the losing teams. Define ∆I := W − w and ∆T := w − l. Since
8In principle, we can also discriminate between the winner and the losers in a losing team. Here, we only
consider a three-level reward scheme to reduce the number of parameters and simplify the analysis. The
substance of our analysis is not affected even if we assume that the winner in a losing team earns more than
the losers.
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what matters for each agent is the reward dispersion, the incentive scheme can alternatively
written as (∆I ,∆T ): for expositional purposes, we refer to ∆I (∆T ) as the individual (team)
incentive. Let φ := ∆I∆T denote the incentive ratio. The extent of the individual incentive
measures the intensity of the internal competition.
The total prize is fixed at R, which is entirely captured by the winning team and shared
among its members, possibly depending on the contest outcomes, so that R =W + (n− 1)w
and l = 0. We impose two assumptions on the set of feasible incentive schemes. First, there
is a liquidity constraint such that each reward must be nonnegative, i.e., W,w ≥ 0. Second,
we also require that an incentive scheme be monotonic in that W ≥ w ≥ l = 0.9 We use the
prize size R as a measure of the intensity of the external competition.
3 Incentives in multilayered tournaments
3.1 Optimal effort choices
In this section, we characterize the optimal effort choices by taking the incentive scheme
(∆I ,∆T ) and the team size n as given. Throughout the analysis, we seek for a symmetric
equilibrium where all agents choose the same effort pair. When all the other agents choose
(a, b), we can write
xij = F (aij , b), xi′j = F (a,
(n−2)b+bij
n−1 ), i
′ ∈ I−ij.
The probability that agent i wins the internal competition conditional on his effort choice
(aij , bij) is then given by
rij = r(aij , bij) =
F (aij , b)
α
F (aij , b)α + (n− 1)F (a,
(n−2)b+bij
n−1 )
α
,
for n ≥ 2. Similarly, the probability that team j wins the external competition is given by
qj = q(aij , bij) =
(F (aij , b) + (n− 1)F (a,
(n−2)b+bij
n−1 ))
α
(F (aij , b) + (n− 1)F (a,
(n−2)b+bij
n−1 ))
α + (m− 1)nαF (a, b)α
.
Taking (a, b) as given, the problem faced by each agent is formulated as follows:
max
aij ,bij
qjrij∆I + qj∆T − C(aij , bij).
9Needless to say, the optimal incentive scheme is indeed monotonic for a wide range of parameters. In this
framework, however, there may actually arise a case where it is optimal to inhibit the incentive to exert own
effort by offering a negative ∆I , if it feasible to do so. We rule out this possibility because a non-monotonic
incentive scheme may provide agents a detrimental incentive to “game the system,” e.g., by intentionally
hiding or destroying his own output. Moreover, a non-monotonic incentive scheme may not be optimal from
the fairness point of view because it is highly demoralizing to punish the most productive agent.
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The first-order conditions are obtained as
∂qj
∂aij
(rij∆I +∆T ) + qj
∂rij
∂aij
∆I = C1,
∂qj
∂bij
(rij∆I +∆T ) + qj
∂rij
∂bij
∆I = C2.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions are reduced to
αGPa = F (a, b), (1)
αHPb = F (a, b), (2)
where
Pa :=
(N − 1)∆I + (N − n)∆T
N2
, Pb :=
−∆I + (N − n)∆T
N2
.
We assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied at the optimum: for instance, they
are satisfied if α is sufficiently small. See Appendix B for more detail on the first- and
second-order conditions.
Let (a∗(∆I ,∆T ), b
∗(∆I ,∆T )), or simply (a
∗, b∗), denote the solution to the pair of equa-
tions, (1) and (2), and x∗ = F (a∗, b∗). The equilibrium effort pair (a∗, b∗) is determined
largely by Pa and Pb. It is important to note that an increase in the individual incentive ∆I
could diminish the incentive to help others as it unambiguously decreases Pb. The reason for
this is intuitive and fairly straightforward: more intense competition at the individual level
discourages agents to allocate resources to others, as there is more to lose by helping others.
This feature is the driving force of many results that follow.
3.2 On the role of multilayered tournaments
The current setup makes two key departures from standard tournament models that are
widely analyzed. First and foremost, competition is multilayered where the agents compete
with each other simultaneously on the two different levels. Second, the effort-choice problem
in our setup is multi-dimensional in that each agent must allocate resources to two distinct
activities – own effort and helping effort – that may be imperfect substitutes for each other.
There is a close association between these two elements in that one ceases to have any value
when the other is absent. To illustrate what a multilayered tournament can give, we consider
two benchmark cases and contrast them with the current setup.
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A single-layered tournament: We first consider the case of single-layered competition
where each agent competes directly with all the others on the same level as usually assumed.10
In the current setup, the case with n = 1 (and also n = N) corresponds to this standard
specification. It is evident that helping effort cannot be induced in single-layered tournaments
as it can only lower his chance of winning. Given this, (1) becomes
α
(N − 1)(∆I +∆T )
N2
=
F (a∗, 0)
F1
C1,
for any given incentive scheme (∆I ,∆T ). Evidently, since ∆I and ∆T are perfect substitutes
in this case, each agent’s effort incentive depends only on ∆I +∆T =W .
A multilayered tournament with no helping effort: As another benchmark, consider
the case where helping effort is not a viable option for the agents, either because it is pro-
hibitively costly or because it carries no productive value, so that b∗ = 0. In this case, (1)
becomes
α
(N − 1)∆I + (N − n)∆T
N2
=
F (a∗, 0)
F1
C1.
Note that an increase in ∆I is more effective in raising a
∗ than an increase in ∆T due to
the freerider problem. This suggests that zero reward should be allocated to the external
competition in order to maximize the total effort.
Comparison: The two benchmark cases are instructive in illuminating the role of multilay-
ered competition in general. To see this, we write the total effort as a function of n, denoted
by x∗(n), and compare these benchmarks in terms of the total effort induced.11 We establish
the following result which indicates some necessary conditions for multilayered tournaments
to have any value.
Proposition 1 Take (∆I ,∆T ) as given. If helping effort is not a viable option, x
∗(1) ≥ x∗(n)
for any n ∈ N .
Proof: To prove this, it suffices to show that
(N − 1)(∆I +∆T )
N2
≥
(N − 1)∆I + (N − n)∆T
N2
,
which holds with equality, for any n ∈ N , only if ∆T = 0.
10There are no losers in the winning team in this case, and the winner simply captures W .
11Define pi(n) := vNx∗(n)−∆I − n∆T , where v is some constant, as total profit. Note that since the total
prize is weakly increasing in n, x∗(1) ≥ x∗(n) is a sufficient condition for pi∗(1) ≥ pi∗(n) for any n ≥ 2.
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In short, an integral ingredient of multilayered competition is the possibility or the neces-
sity of helping others: the value of multilayered competition naturally diminishes when the
production process becomes more individualistic and requires less cooperation. The propo-
sition states that multilayered competition has no bite when it is virtually impossible or
meaningless to help others (the case of purely individualistic production). The factor that is
especially critical is the imperfect substitutability of the two types of effort which gives rise
to several interesting properties of multilayered tournaments as we will see shortly.
3.3 Efficient allocation
Properties of the efficient allocation are to a large degree independent of the shape of F .
Consider a social planner who can impose any effort pair (a, b) without any cost. The social
planner’s problem is then defined as
max
a,b
F (a, b)− C(a, b).
The first-order conditions with respect to a and b imply that
F1 = C1, F2 = C2.
The question of particular interest is whether and how this efficient allocation is implemented
via an appropriately designed incentive scheme. To do so, it is easy to observe that Pa = Pb,
which in turn implies ∆I = 0. Given this, the efficient allocation is implemented if ∆T is set
so as to satisfy
α
(N − n)∆T
N2
= F (a∗(0,∆T ), b
∗(0,∆T )). (3)
Let ∆efT denote the team incentive which satisfies (3), and R
ef := n∆efT the total prize size
required to achieve the (unconstrained) efficient allocation. We summarize this finding as
follows (the proof abbreviated).
Proposition 2 Suppose that the social planner can choose any R at no cost. The efficient
allocation is then implemented by (0,∆efT ) where ∆
ef
T solves (3).
3.4 Hidden costs of incentives and the multi-task interpretation of team
One important aspect of the model is that an increase in the individual incentive inhibits
cooperative behavior among teammates. Although intense internal competition can be ben-
eficial up to some point, as it can provide stronger incentives for each agent and induce a
higher level of own effort, it is necessarily at the expense of a decrease in helping effort. This
could result in inefficient substitution of the two efforts and could even lower the total effort
x∗ when the incentive ratio is highly unbalanced to begin with.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that the two types of effort are complementary to each other, i.e.,
G2 > 0 and H1 > 0. Then, there exists some φ¯ ∈ [0, N − n) such that an increase in ∆I ,
with ∆T fixed, reduces the total effort for φ ≥ φ¯ if there exists some finite number L(a) for
any given a > 0 such that
lim
b→0
F2(F12C2 − C12F2)− F1(F22C2 − C22F2)
F 22C2
< L(a). (4)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The proposition states that an increase in the individual incentive ∆I , with ∆T fixed,
may reduce the total effort supplied by each agent, thereby shedding light on yet another
mechanism through which the adverse effect of incentives arises. The condition we obtain is
not something that holds only under extreme conditions, as it is satisfied by many standard
specifications of F and C. To see this, when the cost is additively separable and linear in
each type of effort, (4) is reduced to
lim
b→0
(F12
F2
−
F1F22
F 22
)
< L(a),
which is satisfied by many standard production functions. See section 5 for a more specific
example of the model.
When one side of the incentive scheme is exogenously fixed, the model yields implications
that are closely related to two well known results in the literature. On one hand, the adverse
effect of incentives is driven by the fact that an increase in ∆I induces inefficient substitution
between the two types of effort, where each agent shifts resources from more productive
helping effort to less productive own effort. In this sense, the result can be seen as yet
another manifestation of the multi-task problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). On the
other hand, this result also runs parallel to Lazear (1989) who points out that an increase
in wage spread lowers total surplus (output net of effort cost), though not total effort, in a
tournament when agents have the option of sabotaging others. Here, an increase in ∆I leads
to a reduction in helping effort, which is qualitatively equivalent to an increase in sabotage,
when ∆T is held fixed for some exogenous reasons.
The result thus illuminates an inherent connection between the two widely cited rationales
for the adverse effect of incentives. The commonality of the two is that agents must allocate
resources into several different activities. To induce desirable behavior along several different
dimensions, the principal typically needs as many contracting measures. If there are not
enough contractible variables to cover the whole set of activities, some of the incentives may
need to be muted to achieve the right balance of efforts, which is precisely the point made by
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Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). In Lazear (1989), an increase in wage spread results in more
sabotage (or less cooperation) because there is only one contractible measure, i.e., individual
ranking, while the agents must allocate resources into two distinct activities. The analysis
thus suggests a virtue of dividing agents into smaller subsets in a competitive environment
where performances can be measured only in relative terms, as it is instrumental in inducing
within-group cooperation by making an additional performance measure, i.e., team ranking,
available for contracting.
4 Optimal provision of incentives
In this section, we assume that the total prize size is exogenously fixed at R ∈ (0, Ref )
and examine how a change in the underlying environment, namely the incentive scheme
(∆I ,∆T ) and the team size n, on each agent’s incentives and the aggregate outcome under
this restriction.
4.1 Effort-maximizing incentive scheme
The effort-maximizing incentive scheme is the solution to the following problem:
max
∆I ,∆T
F (a∗, b∗),
subject to
R ≥ ∆I + n∆T .
Our primary interest is in how the extent of internal competition, measured by ∆I , is related
to the extent of external competition, measured by R, i.e., what fraction of the total prize
should be allocated to the individual winner.
Proposition 4 Suppose that F and C are homogenous functions. For any given R > 0, the
effort-maximizing incentive scheme can be written as
∆∗I =
φ∗
φ∗ + n
R, ∆∗T =
1
φ∗ + n
R,
where φ∗ ∈ [0, N − n) is some constant which is bounded from above.
Proof: See Appendix A.
A corollary of this result is that the effort-maximizing team incentive is always bounded
away from zero, while the effort-maximizing individual incentive can be zero in some cases.
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To see under what conditions ∆∗I = 0 holds, note that when F and C are both homogeneous,
the optimality condition can be written as
Pa
Pb
=
H(a
b
, 1)
G(a
b
, 1)
.
Under the maintained assumptions, there exists a unique ψ such that
1 =
H(ψ, 1)
G(ψ, 1)
.
This is the minimum effort ratio which can be implemented by a feasible incentive scheme:
for any a
b
> ψ, there is a unique incentive ratio which can implement the effort ratio. This
means that it is more likely to have ∆∗I = 0 if helping effort is relatively more productive
than own effort and ψ is higher.
Our analysis is instrumental in illuminating the elusive link between the two distinct levels
of competition: within-group (internal) competition and across-group (external) competition.
As emphasized, the most important example of this framework is the case where agents
compete for internal resources within organizations, such as firms, and for external resources
across organizations. Regarding this link, we emphasize two points that are of particular
importance.
General superiority of team incentives: As shown in Proposition 4, the optimal incentive
ratio can be zero but is bounded from above. There are actually two sides to this statement.
First, the optimal individual incentive might be zero, meaning that it is optimal to mute
any within-group competition by treating all the teammates equally (low-powered individual
incentives) under some conditions. Second, the optimal team incentive is always positive and
bounded from below, even though its effectiveness is severely limited by the freerider problem.
These two facts together point to the general superiority of team incentives in this type of
setup, which is consistent with Williamson’s observation that that high-powered incentives
are more common in market arrangements than within firms (Williamson, 1985).
The reason why the team incentive is more effective in this context stems from the fact
that it works at a higher level than the individual incentive and can hence yield a positive
impact on both types of effort. This draws clear contrast to the individual incentive which
can induce own effort only at the expense of a decrease in helping effort. Because of this,
when the level of ∆T is small compared to ∆I , the agents choose to exert zero helping effort,
which is never optimal given that limb→0H(a, b) = ∞. The same argument does not apply
to the case of the individual incentive because a positive team incentive, no matter how small
it is, can induce a positive level of own effort even if ∆I = 0.
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Complementarity between internal and external incentives: Our analysis also reveals
the importance of balancing the incentives at the two ends. Proposition 4 shows that given
an exogenous decrease in R, both ∆I and ∆T must be reduced proportionally, implying that
the optimal level of incentives provided at one level of competition cannot be independent of
that at the other level. We argue that the individual and team incentives are largely com-
plementary to each other, so that a decrease in one should be accompanied by a decrease in
the other in order to maintain the right balance between competition and cooperation. As
more practical implications, the result suggests that: stronger individual incentives tend to
work well in environments with more intense market competition; pro-competitive policies
are more likely to be justified in environments where stronger individual incentives are pro-
vided within firms. The model provides a critical policy insight that there exists no set of
competition policies that are universally effective because the extent of market regulations
should depend on how incentives are provided within firms, which could vary substantially
across industries as well as countries.
4.2 Effort-maximizing team size
It should be clear that the team size, or equivalently the number of teams, plays a critical
role in almost every aspect of the model. We now turn our attention to the effect of the
team size n which is another key component of the incentive scheme.12 An increase in the
team size obviously exacerbates the freerider problem and yields a detrimental effect on effort
provision. Despite this, a larger team can also bring about a positive effect, as it may allow
the teammates to reap the benefit of the scale effect more effectively. The basic idea is that
when (i) the agents are heterogenous and complementary to each other, and (ii) the set
of tasks they need to work on is highly diversified, it is intrinsically easier, or equivalently
more productive, to help each teammate by a small margin than to devote all of helping
effort intensively to one agent, or it is easier to find someone who an agent can help with his
expertise when there are more teammates to work with. Alternatively, the cost of helping
effort also decreases with n when it is a contribution to a public good, such as disclosure of
indispensable production knowledge, whose benefit is non-rival among the teammates.
To capture this idea and tradeoff, we add more structure to the cost function. More
specifically, we now assume that the cost function is given by
C(aij , bij) = c(aij ,
bij
β(n)).
That is, the production function is augmented with a new function β(n) which measures the
12Here, we basically ignore the integer problem.
15
relative productivity of helping effort. For the subsequent analysis, we ignore the integer
problem and treat n as if it is a continuous variable for n ∈ N . We in general assume that
β(n) is weakly increasing and weakly concave in n. Let x∗(n) denote the equilibrium total
effort as a function of the team size. We are interested in how a change in the team size
affects each agent’s effort choices for n ∈ N .13
Due to the scale effect of helping effort, the socially optimal team size, when the social
planner can directly impose the effort levels, is n = N . This is not incentive compatible,
however, because there is clearly no incentive for any agent to exert helping effort when he is
in a grand coalition which involves all the agents. Because of this inability to take advantage
of the scale effect, the case with n = N is weakly dominated even by the least efficient case
where each team consists of only one agent (n = 1).14 To induce a positive level of helping
effort, the team size should be bounded between n = 2 and n = N2 .
The optimal effort pair is now given by a∗(∆I ,∆T , n), b
∗(∆I ,∆T , n). Taking (∆I ,∆T ) as
given, an increase in the team size raises the total effort if
F1
∂a∗
∂n
+ F2
∂b∗
∂n
> 0.
Let n∗ := argmaxn∈Nx
∗(n) denote the effort-maximizing team size in the interval N . The
effort-maximizing team size depends largely on the magnitude of the scale effect, which is
captured by β′, and the incentive ratio φ. While it is intuitive and clear that a larger scale
effect always favors a larger team size, the effect of φ is more somewhat complicated. We
state the following result concerning how the effort-maximizing team size is related to the
incentive scheme in effect.
Proposition 5 n∗ > 2 only if
N∆T
(N − 1)∆I + (N − n)∆T
=
N
(N − 1)φ+N − n
≥ β′(2).
Under the optimal incentive scheme (∆∗I ,∆
∗
T ) derived in Proposition 4, n
∗ > 2 if and only if
β′(2) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
13There is of course a possibility that the effort-maximizing team size is one. This is more likely to be the
case if the two types of effort are more substitutive and/or the productivity of helping effort is very low. Given
the spirit of this problem, however, we do not consider this possibility and simply assume that x∗(2) > x∗(1).
14To see this, note that b∗(N) = 0 for n = N , so that the total effort is given by α (N−1)∆I
N2
=
F (a∗(N),0)
F1(a∗(N),0)
a∗
γ−1. See section 3.2 for the case with n = 1. Comparing these, it is clear that x∗(1) ≥ x∗(N) for
any given (∆I ,∆T ).
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First, it is clear that the total effort is monotonically decreasing in n ∈ N in the absence
of the scale effect, i.e., when β′(n) = 0 for all n ∈ N . When β′(2) > 0, on the other hand,
a larger team size may increase the total output. To see when a larger team size is more
desirable, observe that an increase in the team size renders the team incentive less effective
and hence yields an effect similar to a decrease in ∆T . Because of this, an increase in the team
size tends to have a favorable effect on the total effort when the incentive ratio is relatively
low: a larger team is likely to be more desirable when the individual incentive ∆I is weak
relative to the team incentive ∆T . In contrast, when the individual incentive is relatively
strong (or the incentive ratio is relatively high), a small team is generally desirable, and it
may even be desirable to have no team at all.
5 An example: CES production function with linear cost
In this section, we provide a specific example of the model by employing more specific produc-
tion and cost functions in order to obtain sharper predictions and implications. Specifically,
we assume that the production function takes the following CES form:
xij = F (aij , hij) =
(a1−ρij
2
+
h
1−ρ
ij
2
) 1
1−ρ
. (5)
The key parameter is ρ ∈ [0,∞) which measures the elasticity of substitution between own
effort and helping effort. Since we are interested in cases where helping effort is inherently
different from own effort and cannot be easily substituted, we assume that ρ > 1, i.e., the
two types of effort are sufficiently complementary to each other. We also assume that the
cost function is given by
C(aij , bij) = aij +
bij
β
. (6)
Under this specification, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 Under the production and cost functions specified in (5) and (6), the equilibrium
effort levels are given by
x∗ = αA(P σa + (βPb)
σ)
1
σ , a∗ =
αP 1+σa
P σa + (βPb)
σ
, b∗ =
α(βPb)
1+σ
P σa + (βPb)
σ
,
where σ := 1−ρ
ρ
and A := 2
− 1
1−ρ .
Proof: Given the production function (5), the equilibrium conditions are computed as
αPaA(a
∗1−ρ + b∗1−ρ)
ρ
1−ρa∗
−ρ = A(a∗1−ρ + b∗1−ρ)
1
1−ρ ,
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αβPbA(a
∗1−ρ + b∗1−ρ)
ρ
1−ρ b∗−ρ = A(a∗1−ρ + b∗1−ρ)
1
1−ρ .
With some computation, these can be written as
αPa = (a
∗1−ρ + b∗1−ρ)a∗ρ =
(x∗
A
)1−ρ
a∗ρ,
αβPb = (a
∗1−ρ + b∗1−ρ)b∗ρ =
(x∗
A
)1−ρ
b∗ρ,
from which we obtain the expressions in the lemma.
The lemma shows that the total effort is given by a very simple and tractable form which
allows us to conduct various comparative statics exercises and verify our preceding results.
Among them, we are particularly interested in the effect of an increase in the individual
incentive ∆I on the total effort x
∗. Note that in this setup, (4) can be written as
lim
b→0
(F12
F2
−
F1F22
F 22
)
=
ρa−ρ(1 + (a
b
)1−ρ)
a1−ρ + b1−ρ
,
which is bounded from above for any given a > 0 under the maintained assumption of ρ > 1,
meaning that the condition in Proposition 3 is satisfied.
Proposition 6 There exists φ¯ ∈ [0, N − n) such that an increase in ∆I decreases x
∗ for
φ > φ¯. If N − 1 > βσ, φ¯ > 0.
Proof: An increase in ∆I decreases x
∗ if
A
N
(P σa + (βPb)
σ)
1−σ
σ ((N − 1)P σ−1a − β
σ
nP
σ−1
b ) < 0. (7)
The left-hand side represents the marginal increase in total effort per worker. It then follows
from this that an increase in ∆I reduces the total effort if
(N − 1)P σ−1a < β
σP σ−1b ,
which is simplified to
p =
(N − 1)φ+N − n
−φ+N − n
>
(N − 1
βσn
) 1
1−σ
.
Note that p ranges from one (at φ = 0) to infinity (at φ = N − n). There exists an interior
threshold φ¯ if N − 1 > βσ. Otherwise, the total effort is monotonically decreasing in ∆I .
18
We can also obtain sharper predictions on the effect of n on the total effort x∗. To this
end, we now let the cost function (6) be given by
C(aij, bij) = aij +
bij
γ(n− 1)λ
,
where β = γ(n − 1)λ and λ ∈ [0, 1].15 It directly follows from Lemma 1 that the total effort
is increasing in n if
−(n− 1)(P σ−1a + β
σP σ−1b )
∆T
N2
+ λ(βPb)
σ > 0. (8)
The first term indicates the loss of incentives due to the freerider problem and is always
negative. The second term indicates the efficiency gain from the scale effect and is always
positive by definition. The effort-maximizing team size must balance this tradeoff.
The effort-maximizing team size is relatively straightforward to obtain when the scale
effect of helping effort is absent. If λ = 0, i.e., helping effort exhibits no scale effect, this
condition is reduced to
−(P σ−1a + β
σP σ−1b ) > 0,
which obviously never holds. This implies that the total effort is strictly decreasing in n for
n ∈ N due to the incentive to freeride. In contrast, when λ > 0, the total effort may increase
with the team size if
λ(γPb)
σ > (n− 1)(P σ−1a + γ
σP σ−1b )
∆T
N2
.
This condition is likely to be satisfied when the incentive ratio is small, so that the agents
allocate more resources to helping effort: as φ→ 0, we have
λγσ(N − n)
(n− 1)∆T
> 1 + γσ.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a tractable framework to analyze multilayered competition which we
ubiquitously observe. The framework allows us to analyze the interconnection between the
two levels of competition, internal (within-group) and external (across-group), and how they
are and should be related to each other. Among other things, we find that: (i) an increase
in individual incentives, holding the extent of team incentives fixed, can lower overall per-
formances because it induces inefficient substitution of effort; (ii) the extent of individual
15Under this specification, the scale effect is absent when λ = 0 while helping effort is a pure public good
whose cost is independent of the number of beneficiaries when λ = 1.
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incentives should be complementary to that of team incentives. The latter finding suggests
that when we devise an incentive scheme within a firm, the extent of market competition
that the firm faces is an important factor to be reckoned with. We also use our framework to
explain why high-powered incentives are more common in market arrangements than within
firms.
As a final note, one limitation of the analysis is that we only consider symmetric cases
where agents are all identical and grouped into teams of the same size. One possible extension
along this line is therefore to introduce heterogeneity among agents and allow them to differ
in innate productivity. The extension adds another dimension to the problem and allows us
to ask how agents should be sorted into teams (positive or negative assortative matching).
The other possibility is to consider the case where teams vary in size and productivity so that
some teams are larger than others. Although the analysis in either direction could become
much more complicated, as we rely on the imposed symmetric structure to make it tractable,
it is nonetheless of some interest to analyze these extended cases.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to ∆I
yields
Pa
(
G1
∂a∗
∂∆I
+G2
∂b∗
∂∆I
)
+
(N − 1)G
N2
= F1
∂a∗
∂∆I
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆I
,
Pb
(
H1
∂a∗
∂∆I
+H2
∂b∗
∂∆I
)
−
H
N2
= F1
∂a∗
∂∆I
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆I
.
Solving these we obtain
∂a∗
∂∆I
=
(N − 1)(F2 −H2Pb)G− (G2Pa − F2)H
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
,
∂b∗
∂∆I
=
(N − 1)(H1Pb − F1)G− (F1 −G1Pa)H
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
.
It follows from these that
∂x∗
∂∆I
= F1
∂a∗
∂∆I
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆I
=
(N − 1)(F2H1 − F1H2)GPb − (F1G2 − F2G1)HPa
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
. (9)
We first show that the denominator of (9) is always positive, i.e., (F1−G1Pa)(F2−H2Pb) >
(G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1). This can be written as
(F2H1 − F1H2)Pb + (F1G2 − F2G1)Pa + (G1H2 −G2H1)PaPb > 0,
which holds under the maintained assumption that G1 > 0, H2 > 0, G2 < 0 and H1 < 0.
Given this, it now suffices to show that the numerator is negative, i.e.,
lim
Pb→0
(F1G2 − F2G1)HPa
(F2H1 − F1H2)GPb
> N − 1,
22
for any given Pa > 0. Since
H1 =
F12C2 − C12F2
C22
, H2 =
F22C2 − C22F2
C22
,
Pa
Pb
=
H
G
,
we have
lim
Pb→0
(F1
F12C1−C12F1
C21
− F2
F11C1−C11F1
C21
)(F2
C2
)2
(F2
F12C2−C12F2
C22
− F1
F2C2−C2F2
C22
)(F1
C1
)2
> N − 1,
which is further reduced to
lim
Pb→0
C1F12
F1
− C12 −
F2F11C1
F 21
+ F2C11
F1
C2F12
F2
− C12 −
F1F22C2
F 22
+ F1C22
F2
= lim
Pb→0
C1F12
F1C2
− C12
C2
− F2F11C1
F 21C2
+ F2C11
F1C2
F12
F2
− C12
C2
− F1F22C2
F 22
+ F1C22
F2
> N − 1, (10)
Note that as Pb → 0, we have b→ 0 and H →∞ while a > 0 and G is bounded from above.
We first show that the numerator diverges to infinity as Pb → 0, i.e.,
lim
b→0
(C1F12
F1C2
−
C12
C2
−
F2F11C1
F 21C2
+
F2C11
F1C2
)
=∞.
With some algebra, this condition can be written as
lim
b→0
(C21G2
F1C2
−
HF11
GF1
+
HC11
F1
)
=∞,
which holds true under the maintained assumptions. Given this, (10) holds if there exists
some finite number L(a) for any a > 0 such that
lim
b→0
F12
F2
−
C12
C2
−
F1F22C1
F 22
+
F1C22
F2
= lim
b→0
F2(F12C2 − C12F2)− F1(F22C
2
2 − F2C2C22)
F 22C2
< L.
Proof of Proposition 4: Under the restriction that R = ∆I+n∆T , the optimal incentive
scheme must satisfy
n
(
F1
∂a∗
∂∆I
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆I
)
= F1
∂a∗
∂∆T
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆T
. (11)
It is clear from this that ∆∗T > 0 under Assumption 3.
To obtain ∂a
∗
∂∆T
and ∂b
∗
∂∆T
, we differentiate the first-order conditions with respect to ∆T :
Pa
(
G1
∂a∗
∂∆T
+G2
∂b∗
∂∆T
)
+
(N − n)G
N2
= F1
∂a∗
∂∆T
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆T
,
Pb
(
H1
∂a∗
∂∆T
+H2
∂b∗
∂∆T
)
+
(N − n)H
N2
= F1
∂a∗
∂∆T
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆T
.
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Solving these, we obtain
∂a∗
∂∆T
=
(N − n)((G2Pa − F2)H + (F2 −H2Pb)G)
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
,
∂b∗
∂∆T
=
(N − n)((H1Pb − F1)G+ (F1 −G1Pa)H)
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
.
It follows from these that
F1
∂a∗
∂∆T
+ F2
∂b∗
∂∆T
=
(N − n)((F2H1 − F1H2)GPb + (F1G2 − F2G1)HPa)
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
.
Combined with (9), we can rewrite (11) as
(N − n)((F2H1 − F1H2)GPb + (F1G2 − F2G1)HPa
(N − 1)(F2H1 − F1H2)GPb + (F2G1 − F1G2)HPa
= n,
which is simplified to
(n− 1)(F2H1 − F1H2)G
2 = (F1G2 − F2G1)H
2.
Given that F and C are homogenous functions, this condition can be rewritten as
n− 1 = Ω(a
b
) :=
(F1(
a
b
, 1)G2(
a
b
, 1) − F2(
a
b
, 1)G1(
a
b
, 1))H(a
b
, 1)2
(F2(
a
b
, 1)H1(
a
b
, 1)− F1(
a
b
, 1)H2(
a
b
, 1))G(a
b
, 1)2
.
Given that there exists an interior solution to satisfy this, we have a constant optimal effort
ratio ψ such that n− 1 = Ω(ψ) for any R. The optimal incentive scheme must solve
Pa
Pb
=
(N − 1)φ+N − n
−φ+N − n
=
H(ψ, 1)
G(ψ, 1)
,
if there exists an interior solution.
Define ψ such that
1 =
H(ψ, 1)
G(ψ, 1)
.
There exists an interior solution if
n− 1 < Ω(ψ).
If this condition is satisfied, there exists some φ∗ such that
(N − 1)φ∗ +N − n
−φ∗ +N − n
=
H(ψ, 1)
G(ψ, 1)
.
The resource constraint then implies that
R = φ∗∆T + n∆T .
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Solving this yields the expressions in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5: Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to n, we
obtain:
Pa
(
G1
∂a∗
∂n
+G2
∂b∗
∂n
)
−
∆T
N2
G = F1
∂a∗
∂n
+ F2
∂b∗
∂n
,
Pb
(
H1
∂a∗
∂n
+H2
∂b∗
∂n
)
−
(∆T
N2
− β′nPb
)
H = F1
∂a∗
∂n
+ F2
∂b∗
∂n
.
Solving these, we obtain
∂a∗
∂n
=
(G2Pa − F2)(∆T − β
′PbN)H − (F2 − βH2Pb)∆TG)
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 − βH2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(βH1Pb − F1))
,
∂b∗
∂n
=
−(βH1Pb − F1)∆TG− (F1 −G1Pa)(∆T − β
′PbN)H
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 − βH2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(βH1Pb − F1))
.
An increase in n increases the total effort if
F1
∂a∗
∂n
+ F2
∂b∗
∂n
= −
β(F2H1 − F1H2)∆TGPb + (F1G2 − F2G1)(∆T − β
′Pb)HPa
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
> 0. (12)
It is evident from this that this condition holds only if
∆T ≥ β
′PbN ⇔
N∆T
(N − 1)∆I + (N − n)∆T
≥ β′.
Under the optimal contract (∆∗I ,∆
∗
T ), (13) becomes
β′
(F1G2 − F2G1)Pb
N2((F1 −G1Pa)(F2 −H2Pb)− (G2Pa − F2)(H1Pb − F1))
> 0, (13)
which holds if and only if β′(2) > 0.
Appendix B: derivation of the first- and second-order condi-
tions
B.1 The first-order conditions
The first-order conditions are given by
∂qj
∂aij
(rij∆I +∆T ) + qj
∂rij
∂aij
∆I = C1,
∂qj
∂bij
(rij∆I +∆T ) + qj
∂rij
∂bij
∆I = C2.
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It is straightforward to compute
∂rij
∂aij
= F1
∂rij
∂xij
= F1
α(n − 1)xα−1ij x
α
(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)2
,
∂rij
∂bij
=
F2
n− 1
∂rij
∂x
= −F2
αxαijx
α−1
(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)2
,
∂qj
∂aij
= F1
∂qj
∂xij
= F1
α(m− 1)zα−1j z
α
(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)2
,
∂qj
∂bij
=
F2
n− 1
∂qj
∂x
= F2
α(m− 1)zα−1j z
α
(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)2
,
In a symmetric equilibrium (a∗, b∗), we have
∂rij
∂aij
= F1
α(n − 1)
n2x∗
,
∂rij
∂bij
= −F2
α
n2x∗
,
∂qj
∂aij
= F1
α(N − n)
N2x∗
,
∂qj
∂bij
= F2
α(N − n)
N2x∗
,
It follows from these that the first-order conditions can be written as
α
(N − 1)∆I + (N − n)∆T
N2x∗
F1 = C1, α
−∆I + (N − n)∆T
N2x∗
F2 = C2.
B2 The second-order conditions
The second-order conditions are given by
∂2qj
∂a2ij
(rij∆I +∆T ) + 2
∂qj
∂aij
∂rij
∂aij
∆I + qj
∂2rij
∂a2ij
∆I < C11,
∂2qj
∂b2ij
(rij∆I +∆T ) + 2
∂qj
∂bij
∂rij
∂bij
∆I + qj
∂2rij
∂b2ij
∆I < C22.
With some algebra, we obtain
∂2rij
∂a2ij
=
α(n − 1)xα−1ij x
α
(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)2
(
F11 + F1
(α− 1)(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)− 2αxαij
(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)xij
)
,
∂2rij
∂b2ij
= −
αxαijx
α−1
(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)2
(
F22 + F2
(α− 1)(xαij + (n − 1)x
α)− 2α(n − 1)xα
(n− 1)(xαij + (n− 1)x
α)x
)
,
∂2qj
∂a2ij
=
α(m− 1)zα−1j z
α
(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)2
(
F11 + F1
(α− 1)(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)− 2αzαj
(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)zj
)
,
∂2qj
∂b2ij
=
α(m− 1)zα−1j z
α
(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)2
(
F22 + F2
(α− 1)(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)− 2αzαj
(zαj + (m− 1)z
α)zj
)
.
In a symmetric equilibrium (a∗, b∗), we have
∂2rij
∂a2ij
=
α(n− 1)
n2x∗
(
F11 + F1
(α− 1)n− 2α
nx∗
)
=
∂rij
∂aij
(F11
F1
+
(α− 1)n− 2α
nx∗
)
,
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∂2rij
∂b2ij
= −
α
n2x∗
(
F22 + F2
(α− 1)n − 2α(n − 1)
n(n− 1)x∗
)
=
∂rij
∂bij
(F22
F2
+
(α− 1)n − 2α(n − 1)
n(n− 1)x∗
)
,
∂2qj
∂a2ij
=
α(N − n)
N2x∗
(
F11 + F1
(α− 1)N − 2αn
Nnx∗
)
=
∂qj
∂aij
(F11
F1
+
(α− 1)N − 2αn
Nnx∗
)
,
∂2qj
∂b2ij
=
α(N − n)
N2x∗
(
F22 + F2
(α− 1)N − 2αn
Nnx∗
)
=
∂qj
∂aij
(F22
F2
+
(α− 1)N − 2αn
Nnx∗
)
,
where x∗ = F (a∗, b∗). It follows from these that the second-order conditions can be written
as
α(N − n)
N2x∗
(
F11 + F1
(α− 1)N − 2αn
Nnx∗
)(∆I
n
+∆T
)
+ 2(αF1)
2 (n− 1)(N − n)
(Nnx∗)2
+
α(n − 1)
Nnx∗
(
F11 + F1
(α− 1)n− 2α
nx∗
)
∆I < C11, (14)
α(N − n)
N2x∗
(
F22 + F2
(α− 1)N − 2αn
Nnx∗
)(∆I
n
+∆T
)
− 2(αF2)
2 N − n
(Nnx∗)2
∆I −
α
Nnx∗
(
F22 + F2
(α− 1)n − 2α(n − 1)
n(n− 1)x∗
)
∆I < C22, (15)
For any optimal solution (a∗, b∗) where a∗, b∗ > 0, the second-order conditions are satisfied if
α is sufficiently small.
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